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1Abstract
The strong link between private pensions and employment status means that there is
little interest in the equity of private pension arrangements since it is expected that
inequality in earnings will be reproduced in inequality in pensions.   Nevertheless, the
equity of private pensions is an issue as governments in mainly English speaking
OECD countries subsidise their provision through the tax system and governments in
a number of EU countries are now considering this policy as a way of coping with
increases in long-term pension costs due to ageing of their populations.
The favourable tax treatment of private pensions provided in Ireland and the
United Kingdom is outlined and compared with the tax treatment of private pensions
in OECD countries. It is shown that the annual cost of tax expenditure on pensions
amounted to over 1 per cent of GDP in both countries in 1997,  that it substantially
exceeded the cost of their means-tested social assistance schemes and amounted to
two-thirds of direct expenditure on social insurance pensions in Ireland and to one-
third in the U.K.   Evidence relating to the distribution of pension tax expenditure
shows  that the present tax treatment of private pensions is inequitable as about two-
thirds of the benefits accrue to the top two income deciles in both countries and 3 per
cent or less to the bottom two deciles.
Proposals for containing the cost of public pension systems in Europe by
relying on greater private pension provision in the future can learn from experience in
Ireland and Britain that using tax incentives to promote private pension provision
could impose substantial  costs on the Exchequer.  The regressive nature of such
incentives means that all taxpayers have to pay more taxes to provide benefits which
accrue overwhelmingly to higher income taxpayers.
2PRIVATE PENSIONS AND EQUITY IN
IRELAND AND THE U.K.1
1. Introduction
  It is well known from sample surveys that the coverage of occupational and
personal pension plans is very uneven in terms of occupation, industry, sex, age
income and other characteristics2.  There is also evidence that workers with the same
income and the same number of years service receive very different incomes in
retirement because their pensions are provided by different private pension
companies3.   These results can be seen as the expected outcome of job choices,
variations in preferences between present and future consumption, differences in the
income elasticity of demand for a pension, and differences in attitudes to risk.   In
short, private provision of pensions is not expected to be equitable in the sense that
almost everyone will be a member of an occupational or personal pension plan or will
receive the same pension as someone with the same work history or contribution
record.   Why then should we be concerned about private pensions and equity?
One of the major, yet most neglected, reasons is that some governments
subsidise the provision of occupational and personal pensions through the tax system
by granting tax exemptions and deferments for pension saving.   They justify the more
favourable tax treatment of pension saving on economic and social grounds. On
economic grounds,   it is argued that tax incentives encourage long-term saving by
increasing the rate of return on pension investment.  This raises investment and the
capital stock and over time it should result in an increase in output of goods and
services from which pensions can be paid  in the future.4    On social grounds, it is
argued that it is desirable to give tax incentives to encourage people to make provision
for their own retirement.5    These arguments originated primarily in English speaking
countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) which used funded private pension schemes to provide income-related
pensions to  supplement the basic State pension.
Similar arguments are now being made in a number of EU countries (Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain) by governments which believe that greater
reliance on private funded pension schemes provides the best way of coping with
increases in long-term pension costs due to projected increases in the future in the
proportion of older people in the population.  A striking feature of arguments for
greater reliance on private pension provision is that the cost of pension tax reliefs are
generally omitted from projections of the relative cost of public and private provision
                                                
1 This paper is based on recent work on pension tax expenditure in Ireland by Hughes (2000) and in the
U.K. by Sinfield (2000) and Agulnik and Le Grand (1998).   I am grateful to Adrian Sinfield for
stimulating my interest in tax expenditure on pensions, for helpful discussions on measurement issues,
and for supplying data on the cost of pension tax reliefs for the U.K.   I am also grateful to him and to
participants at an LSE conference in January 2002 on Modelling Policy for an Ageing Europe for
comments on an earlier draft.
2 For Ireland see Hughes and Whelan (1996) and for the U.K. see HMSO (2001b).
3 The ILO (2000) provides evidence of such outcomes in Chile where the public pension system was
replaced with a compulsory private pension system.
4 See Feldstein  (1998).
5 See National Pensions Board (1988).
3and that little attention is paid to the effect which redistributing income through the
tax system may have on income inequality in old age.6
Income tax reliefs on such items of personal expenditure as pension
contributions, health contributions, and mortgage repayments amount, in effect, to
expenditure programmes delivered through the tax system.   The term “tax
expenditure”, introduced by Surrey (1973), is used to indicate that these reliefs are not
part of the benchmark tax system and that the foregone revenue is equivalent to direct
government expenditure.   It is appropriate, therefore, that policies which result in tax
expenditure on private pensions should be judged by the same criteria as direct
expenditure programmes and that the same equity principle should be used to evaluate
their effect on the income distribution.
This paper will present evidence on the cost and distribution of tax expenditure
on private pensions which indicates that the Exchequer incurs significant costs
through greater reliance on private pension provision and which suggests that the  tax
treatment of private pension plans is inequitable.    Section 2 provides an overview of
the different regimes which are used to tax pension saving in OECD countries.
Section 3 presents evidence on the cost of  tax expenditure on occupational  pensions
relative to GDP in Ireland and the U.K. and Section 4 compares the cost of their tax
expenditure on private pensions to direct expenditure on public pensions.  Section 5
shows  how the benefits of the tax expenditure on employee contributions to
occupational schemes in Ireland and to occupational and personal pension plans in the
U.K. are distributed by income group.   The results are summarised in Section 6.
The intention in presenting data on the cost and distribution of tax expenditure
on pensions for Ireland and the U.K. is to use them as examples to show that in
countries which rely heavily on private pension provision the costs to the Exchequer
can be substantial and that implementing pensions policy through the tax system is
likely to increase income inequality in old age.  There are important differences in the
cost and distribution of Exchequer support for private pensions in the two countries,
which may be due to the greater maturity of occupational pension schemes in the U.K.
and to the fact that there are personal pension plans in the U.K. but not yet in Ireland.
However, it is not the purpose of this paper to make direct comparisons of the cost
and distribution of pension tax expenditure between the U.K. and Ireland or to try and
explain the differences.
2. Pension Tax Regimes in OECD Countries
Since the early 1980s the Revenue Commissioners in Ireland and the Inland
Revenue in the United Kingdom have published annual estimates of the cost to the
Exchequer of tax support for private pension schemes    Their estimates show that the
cost of the exemption of the net income of private pension plans has generally been
one of the largest items in the list of  tax expenditures.7
                                                
6 Some examples of studies advocating greater reliance on private pensions which omit consideration
of the cost of tax expenditure on pensions are World Bank (1994), Edey and Simon (1998), Budd and
Campbell (1998), Feldstein and Samwick (1998), Borsch-Supan (2000), and Mantel and Bowers
(2000).
7 Official estimates of the cost of tax expenditures on pensions show that the same is true in Australia
(Knox (1991),   the United States (Munnell (1991)) and other OECD countries (OECD (1996)).
4Despite this, and the use by the pension industry of the tax favoured treatment
of pensions as a major selling point,  the industry’s representative body in Ireland,  the
Irish Association of Pension Funds (IAPF), argues that the Exchequer ultimately gets
back most of the tax  foregone on pension contributions and fund income through the
taxation of pension benefits.  For example, the IAPF (1998, p. 1) argues that “it is a
common misconception that pension funds are exempt from tax” because “they
actually operate on the basis of deferred taxation NOT no taxation” and that  “the
exemptions are balanced by the eventual taxation of benefits (except, of course, in
relation to the lump sum) so the net effect is a tax deferral rather than an outright
exemption” (IAPF (1999, p. 1)).   The Pensions Board, the Irish government’s
advisory body on pensions,  appears to share this view as it argues in a recent report
(Pensions Board (1998 p. 146)) on developing the national pension system that “the
tax treatment of pensions, other than lump sums, is essentially tax deferral.” Its
predecessor, the National Pensions Board (1988), argued that “the present tax
treatment of pension funds is simple to understand and operate, is broadly equitable
and clearly acts as a major encouragement to the establishment of funded
occupational pension schemes.”
In recent years the representative body in the United Kingdom, the National
Association of Pension Funds (1999, p. 1) has argued for the introduction of a “tax
‘league table’ of pensions, savings and investment vehicles so that the tax regime can
concentrate on the areas which make the greatest contribution to taking people out of
dependence on State social security benefits, especially in retirement.”    The
advantages of approved private pension plans coming top of this league table,
according to the NAPF (1998, p. 2) are that “in the long run dependency on state
benefits and Government expenditure on welfare will be reduced, while the
Exchequer will benefit from higher pensions in payment.”   The implicit suggestion in
this argument appears to be that the combination of reduced welfare expenditure and
increased tax revenue from private pensions will not only cost the Exchequer nothing,
but will actually make it better off.
The primary basis for raising taxes in OECD countries is income.  Under an
income tax regime pension contributions are taxed (T), the investment income and
capital gains of the pension fund are taxed (T), and pension benefits are exempt (E).
However, because of the desire to encourage people to save for their own retirement,
some countries exempt the interest earned on pension saving from tax.   If all forms of
saving were exempt from tax it would be equivalent to having consumption, rather
than income,  as the basis for taxation. Under a consumption tax regime pension
contributions are exempt (E) from tax, investment income and capital gains are
exempt (E),  and pension benefits, including lump sums, are taxed (see Dilnot (1992)).
An income tax basis for taxing pension saving is described  as a TTE regime and a
consumption tax basis is referred to as an EET regime.    Countries which mix
elements of an income tax and a consumption tax regime to tax pension saving have a
hybrid regime.
Table 1 provides a broad summary of the regimes which were used to tax
occupational pensions in OECD countries around 1993.  From the first three columns
of the table it is evident that a majority of countries favour a consumption tax regime.
The main exceptions are New Zealand,  which has moved to an income tax regime,
5Table 1: Tax Regimes for Occupational Pensions in OECD Countries Around 1993
Country Contributions Pension Fund Pension Benefits
Income Lump Sum
Belgium E E T (t)
Canada E E T Unavailable
France E E T Unavailable
Germany E E T T
Ireland E E T E
Luxembourg E E T T
Netherlands E E T Unavailable
Norway E E T Unavailable
Portugal E E T (t)
Spain E E T T
Switzerland E E T T
United Kingdom E E T E
United States E E T Unavailable
Denmark E (t) T T
Sweden E (t) T Unavailable
Finland (t) E T T
Austria (t) E T T
Australia (t) (t) (t) (t)
Iceland T E T T
Japan T E T (t)
New Zealand T T E T
Sources: OECD (1994), Whitehouse (1999),  Hall (2000), Dilnot and Johnson (1993), and Dalsgaard
(2001).
Note: A small t indicates that the component is taxed at a lower rate than the standard rate of income
tax.
and some of the Nordic countries, Austria, Australia, Iceland, and Japan which use a
hybrid regime.   Almost half of the countries in Table 1 allow some or all of the
pension benefit to be taken in the form of a lump sum payment on retirement.  Ireland
and the United Kingdom stand out in this group as the only countries which totally
exempt lump sum benefits from tax.   All of the other countries which allow payment
of lump sum benefits tax them at standard or lower rates of tax.  Income limits exist in
the United Kingdom, the United States and other OECD countries  on the maximum
benefit which defined benefit schemes can provide and there are contribution limits
for defined contribution schemes, as there are in Ireland for both defined benefit and
defined contribution schemes8.
How do the different approaches to the taxation of pension saving, shown in
Table 1, operate in practice?  This question was investigated some years ago by the
                                                
8 The income cap in the United Kingdom is currently £91,800 sterling; the maximum benefit allowed
in the United States in 1996 was $120,000. In 1997 both the U. K. and Ireland changed the tax
treatment of Advanced Corporation Tax for tax exempt investors such as pension schemes thereby
reducing  somewhat the tax-favoured position of pension saving  relative to other forms of saving.
6OECD (1994).   It adapted a method of measuring incentives for saving and
investment, which King and Fullerton (1984) developed for the corporate sector, to
estimate the marginal effective tax rate on different forms of household saving within
the tax systems operating in OECD countries in 1993.  The effective marginal tax rate
is defined as the difference between the rate of return before and after tax on pension
saving over time.   The tax rates are calculated for those paying at the marginal rates
applicable to the Average Production Worker and to top rate taxpayers.      The results
presented in Table 2 show the marginal effective tax rates on pensions and income for
the two types of household using the  common OECD inflation rate of 3.7 per cent on
Table 2: Marginal Effective Tax Rates for Employer-Sponsored Pension Schemes and
Marginal Tax Rates for an Average Production Worker and a Top Rate Taxpayer in
OECD Countries in 1993
Country Average Production Worker Top Rate Taxpayer
Pension Income Pension Income
Australia -3.9 39.4 -26.5 48.4
Austria -12.5 32.0 -21.4 50.0
Belgium 53.0 45.0 61.4 55.0
Canada 0.0 41.5 0.0 49.8
Denmark 20.6 52.1 20.6 58.1
Finland 37.3 49.0 37.3 60.0
France 0.0 27.1 30.2 59.9
Germany 0.0 29.1 0.0 53.0
Iceland 73.4 41.3 73.4 41.3
Ireland -10.4 27.0 -27.2 48.0
Japan 21.7 20.0 61.7 50.0
Luxembourg 0.0 30.0 0.0 52.5
Netherlands 0.0 38.4 0.0 60.0
New Zealand 67.8 24.0 67.8 33.0
Norway 34.9 44.0 33.7 43.5
Portugal -12.5 25.0 -24.0 40.0
Spain 0.0 24.5 0.0 56.0
Sweden 16.5 34.3 16.5 51.0
Switzerland 1.4 21.7 1.4 43.0
United Kingdom -10.2 25.0 -20.7 40.0
United States 0.0 22.5 0.0 45.9
Source: OECD (1994)
the reference date.  They also assume that income levels during work and retirement
are the same so pensions are not taxed at a lower rate during retirement.  The marginal
rate of tax on income for basic and top rate taxpayers is included in the table to show
the difference between the tax treatment of income and of pension saving.  Table 2
shows that the marginal rate of tax on pension saving is zero for those on average
incomes in Canada, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, and the
United States,  whereas the marginal rate of tax on income is positive.  This means
that these countries tax pension saving as if they had a consumption tax rather than an
income tax.
The marginal rates for pension saving for Australia, Austria, Ireland, Portugal,
and the United Kingdom are negative.  This indicates that  pensions are taxed in these
7countries in a  regime which is more generous than a consumption tax regime.   The
marginal rates for pension saving in the Nordic countries and Switzerland are positive
but less than the marginal rates on income so they have hybrid regimes.   The
marginal rates for pension saving  in Belgium, Iceland, Japan, and New Zealand are
positive and greater than the marginal rates for income so they have regimes which
tax pension saving at higher rates than an income tax regime.   This occurs because no
allowance is made for inflation under an income tax regime which taxes nominal
rather than real rates of return.
For top rate taxpayers the results, in terms of the type of regime used to tax
pension saving,  are similar but the tax incentives are much greater than for average
production workers particularly in countries in which the tax treatment of pensions is
more generous than a consumption tax regime (Australia, Austria, Ireland, Portugal,
United Kingdom).    EU countries which adopt a policy of greater reliance on private
pensions for the future are, therefore, likely to provide the biggest tax incentives to
taxpayers paying the highest marginal tax rates.
3. Estimates of the Cost of  Pension Tax Reliefs in Ireland and the U.K.
Pension schemes in Ireland and the U.K. receive favourable tax treatment by
applying to the tax authorities for “exempt approved status”.   To qualify for this
special status a scheme must be established under an irrevocable trust, the assets of
the fund must be held apart from the employer’s other assets, and disposed of in
accordance with a deed of trust.    As none of the government agencies responsible for
the operation of occupational pension schemes publish statistics on the financial
operations of these schemes the tax authorities in Ireland and the U.K. have based
their estimates of the cost of tax reliefs on different components of pension income
flows on  whatever limited information is available  from different sources.   Annual
estimates,  on a consistent basis,  of the cost of the tax relief on employee
contributions and of the cost of the exemption of the net income of approved funds are
available for Ireland since 1980/81 and for the U.K. for occupational and other private
pension plans since 1986/879.
For Ireland, the most comprehensive estimate of the tax expenditure on
occupational pensions is the value of the tax relief on the net income of approved
superannuation funds.   This is based on total contributions by employers and
employees plus the investment income of the funds minus the amount paid out in
pension benefits and lump sums. For the U.K. Adrian Sinfield (2000, Table 1)
provides estimates of the cost of tax reliefs on employee, employer, and self-
employed contributions to occupational pension schemes, personal pension schemes,
Free Standing Additional Voluntary Contribution schemes, Retirement Annuity
Contracts, the investment income of funds, lump sum payments from unfunded
schemes after deducting income tax receipts from pensions in payment and refunds to
employers of pension surpluses10.
                                                
9 For Ireland see Hughes (2001) and for the U.K. see Sinfield (2000)
10 If tax reliefs for pension saving were eliminated the Exchequer would not necessarily benefit to the
full extent of the value of the tax relief because of behavioural changes by savers.   A similar
interaction effect applies to direct public expenditure.   For example, the Exchequer would not save the
full cost of a social insurance pension scheme by eliminating it as behavioural changes by some
beneficiaries would make them eligible for benefits under other programmes. Neither argument means
8Table 3 shows the Revenue Commissioners estimates for Ireland of the cost of
the tax reliefs on occupational pensions from 1980/81 to 1997/98. Over the whole
period the cost of the tax relief on the net income of approved schemes rose from £30
Table 3: Revenue Commissioners Estimates of the Cost of Tax Reliefs  on the Net
Income of Approved Superannuation Funds in Ireland 1980/81 to 1996/97 (£ million)
and Inland Revenue Estimates of the Cost of Tax Reliefs on Occupational and Other
Non-State Pension Schemes in the United Kingdom 1986/87 to 1998-99 (£ million)
Year Ireland United Kingdom
Net income of
occupational
pension
Funds
£ million
Pension tax
expenditure/
GDP
%
Net income of
private pension
funds
£ million
Pension tax
expenditure/
GDP
%
1980/81 30.0 0.32 - -
1981/82 35.0 0.31 - -
1982/83 40.0 0.30 - -
1983/84 42.0 0.28 - -
1984/85 45.0 0.27 - -
1985/86 53.0 0.30 - -
1986/87 62.0 0.32 6,800 1.77
1987/88 80.0 0.38 6,300 1.49
1988/89 89.0 0.39 6,800 1.44
1989/90 130.0 0.51 7,200 1.41
1990/91 200.0 0.70 7,100 1.28
1991/92 216.0 0.73 7,100 1.21
1992/93 189.0 0.60 8,000 1.32
1993/94 245.2 0.72 7,300 1.14
1994/95 344.0 0.94 10,400 1.53
1995/96 399.0 0.96 11,700 1.64
1996/97 500.0 1.09 12,100 1.60
1997/98 648.0 1.23 10,900 1.35
Sources: Ireland, Annual Report of the Revenue Commissioners 1981 to 1999; U.K.,  Sinfield (2000,
Table 1) and HMSO (2001).
million to £648 million.  Relative to GDP the cost of the favourable tax treatment of
the  net income of pension funds quadrupled from one-third of a percentage point in
1980 to 1.4 per cent in 1997.    Table 3 also shows the cost of tax relief on
occupational and personal pensions in the U.K. from 1986/87 to 1997/98.     In
nominal terms the cost of pensions tax relief increased from £6,800 million in
1986/87 to £10,900 million in 1997/98.   However, relative to GDP the cost of the
reliefs in the U.K. fell from 1.77 per cent to 1.35 per cent.   A significant part of this
decline is probably attributable to the abolition of Advanced Corporation Tax in the
1997 Budget.   Clearly, the cost of pension tax reliefs is substantial in both Ireland and
the U.K.   In the U.K. it has fluctuated around 1.5 per cent of GDP since the mid-
1980s while in Ireland it has increased from a relatively low level at the beginning of
the 1980s to  attain a similar level to that in the U.K. at the end of the 1990s.
                                                                                                                                           
that the cost of tax expenditure on private pensions or direct expenditure on social insurance pensions
should not be given as the full cost.
9As the cost of Exchequer support for private pensions is substantial in both
countries it is necessary to ask how it compares with the cost of Exchequer
expenditure on public pension schemes and how tax expenditure on private pensions
is distributed by income group.     These questions are important because both the
Irish and the British government have expressed concerns in recent years about the
cost of their public pension systems and both governments have taken steps to try and
contain its cost which involve greater reliance in the future on private pension
provision.   There is some information available from a variety of sources in Ireland
and the U.K. which allow us to address  these issues.
4. Tax Expenditure on Occupational Pensions and Direct Expenditure on Social
Welfare Pensions
At the end of the 1980s it was realised  that ageing of the population in the
early decades of the 21st century would increase the cost of state pension schemes in
many OECD countries.   Governments began to look for ways of changing the
balance between state and private pension provision in an attempt to avoid raising
taxes in the future (see OECD (1992)). The British Government concluded (HMSO,
1998b) that the balance of provision should be changed over the next fifty years from
60/40 public/private to 40/60. While it projects the proportion of GDP going to
pensioners to increase from 10 per cent now to about 12 per cent in 2050 such a shift
is expected to reduce public expenditure on pensioners from 6 per cent to around 5 per
cent of GDP and to increase private expenditure on them from 4 per cent to about 7
per cent
The Irish Government has not adopted explicit targets for state and private
provision but it is broadly following a strategy recommended by the Pensions Board
(1998) to gradually raise the flat-rate state pension from a quarter to a third of average
industrial earnings, to accumulate a national pension reserve fund for investment in
financial assets selected from global financial markets, and to try and increase pension
coverage on a voluntary basis by providing access to Personal Retirement Savings
Accounts11.    The effect of these changes would be to increase total pension costs
from 9 per cent of GNP in 1996 to 11 per cent in 2046 (see Pensions Board, 1998,
Table 5.8).   The increase would be borne by both the public and private pension
systems with public pension costs increasing from 4.84 per cent of GNP to 6.24 per
cent and private pension costs increasing from 4.18 per cent to 4.76 per cent of GNP.
In contrast to the British government’s intention to reduce the share of retirement
income provided by the public pension system the outcome in Ireland is likely to be
an increase in the share of retirement income provided by the public pension system
with the balance of  public/private provision changing somewhat from 54/46 now to
57/43 in 50 years time.
The Pensions Board (1998, p. 109) noted that “the purpose of the fund would
be to place a ceiling on the additional Exchequer contribution required for [social
welfare pensions for] the foreseeable future” and it recommended that the tax
treatment of individual retirement savings accounts should be more favourable than
                                                
11 The target is to increase coverage from 54 per cent of those aged 30-65 at work in 1995 to 70 per
cent over a period of ten years or more.
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that for  occupational pension funds. Neither the British or Irish governments have
provided any comparisons of past trends in  Exchequer expenditure on social welfare
pensions relative to tax expenditure on private pensions  nor do they include in their
current expenditure figures or long-term projections estimates of  tax expenditure on
private pensions.
The policy message which comes through the various reports published as part
of the pension reviews in Ireland and Britain is that state pension schemes should be
restricted to paying modest flat-rate benefits while relying on private pensions to
provide more retirement income on a voluntary basis in the future.   It appears to be
assumed that incentives for private pension provision can be given at such little cost
to the Exchequer (see Pensions Board (1997 and 1998)) that they can safely be
ignored in long-term projections of  pension costs.   This assumption will be tested by
looking at the trend in the cost of tax expenditure on occupational pensions in Ireland
and on occupational and personal pensions in the U.K. relative to the trend in  direct
government expenditure on social welfare pensions in both countries.
Tax expenditure on occupational pensions and direct expenditure on social
welfare pensions in Ireland are compared in Table 4 for the period 1980/81 to
1997/98.   At the beginning of the period in 1980 tax expenditure on occupational
pensions amounted to 20 per cent of direct expenditure on contributory social
insurance pensions,   £30 million versus £153 million.    By the end of the period it
had increased to 98 per cent, £648 million versus £661 million.    With respect to non-
contributory social assistance pensions tax expenditure increased from 21 per cent in
1980 (£30 million versus £140 million) to over 200 per cent in 1997 ( £648 million
versus £317 million).
In terms of the combined social welfare pension schemes  the cost of tax
expenditure on occupational schemes increased from 10 per cent in 1980, £30 million
versus £293 million, to over 66 per cent by 1997, £648 million versus £978 million.
Given the average rates of growth of tax and direct expenditure during the period
1987-97 it would only require a few more years growth at these rates for the cost of
tax expenditure on occupational pensions to exceed the direct cost of  expenditure on
social welfare pensions.   The introduction of  Personal Retirement Savings Accounts
(PRSA) with more favourable tax treatment than occupational pension schemes, as
recommended by the Pensions Board,  is likely to  increase  the cost of tax
expenditure on pensions.    One effect of implementing this recommendation may be
that Exchequer support for social welfare pensions will be limited in the future while
the cost of its support for private pension schemes, benefiting a much smaller number
of people, will not be.
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Table 4: Direct Expenditure on State Pensions, Tax Expenditure on Occupational
Pensions and Direct Expenditure as Per Cent of Tax Expenditure on Pensions, Ireland
1980/81 to 1997/98
Year Direct
Expenditure
on
Contributory
Old Age
Pension &
Retirement
Pension
Direct
Expenditure
on
Non-
Contributory
Old Age
Pension
Direct
Expenditure
on State
Pensions
Tax
Expenditure
on
Occupational
Pension
Schemes
Tax
Expenditure
on Occ.
Pensions as
per cent of
Direct Exp.
On State
Pensions
£ million Per cent
1980/81 153.0 140.2 293.2 30.0 10.2
1981/82 197.5 176.4 373.9 35.0 9.4
1982/83 259.3 225.0 484.3 40.0 8.3
1983/84 293.9 246.5 540.4 42.0 7.8
1984/85 325.9 264.1 590.0 45.0 7.6
1985/86 351.7 273.5 625.2 53.0 8.5
1986/87 374.5 283.9 658.4 62.0 9.4
1987/88 399.5 291.2 690.7 80.0 11.6
1988/89 417.2 291.8 709.0 89.0 12.6
1989/90 439.0 293.8 732.8 130.0 17.7
1990/91 464.9 301.5 766.4 200.0 26.1
1991/92 493.9 308.8 802.7 216.0 26.9
1992/93 529.5 317.2 846.7 189.0 22.3
1993/94 546.3 318.4 864.7 245.2 28.4
1994/95 569.0 319.1 888.1 344.0 38.7
1995/96 597.2 308.8 906.0 399.0 44.0
1996/97 626.0 310.3 936.3 500.0 53.4
1997/98 661.2 316.8 978.0 648.0 66.3
Sources:Annual Report of the Revenue Commissioners 1981 to 1999, Statistical Information on Social
Welfare Services 1983 to 1997, and Special Tabulation from the Revenue Commissioners.
Tax expenditure on occupational and personal pensions and direct expenditure
on National Insurance pensions in the U.K. are compared in Table 5 for the period
1986-87 to 1997-98.   At the beginning of the period in 1986 tax expenditure on
occupational and private pensions amounted to 39 per cent of National Insurance
expenditure on the basic retirement pension,   £6.8 billion  versus £17.6 billion.    By
the end of the period it had fallen to 36 per cent, £10.9 billion versus £31.9 billion.
With respect to means-tested assistance for the elderly, which consists almost entirely
of income support and housing and council tax benefits,  Adrian Sinfield (1997, p.
127) points out  that in 1992/93 tax expenditure on private pensions “cost the taxpayer
almost £2 billion more than all means-tested assistance for the poorest old people.”
By 1999/00 tax expenditure on pensions was costing the taxpayer £2.5 billion more
than means-tested assistance for the elderly.
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Table 5: Direct Expenditure on State Pensions, Tax Expenditure on Occupational and
Personal Pensions and Direct Expenditure as Per Cent of Tax Expenditure on
Pensions, United Kingdom 1986-87 to 1997-98
Year Cost of tax reliefs on
net income of
occupational and
personal pensions
£ million
Direct Expenditure on
NI basic retirement
pension
£ million
Pension tax
expenditure/NI
expenditure
%
1986/87 6,800 17,560 38.7
1987/88 6,300 18,356 34.3
1988/89 6,800 18,857 36.1
1989/90 7,200 20,171 35.7
1990/91 7,100 21,973 32.3
1991/92 7,100 24,451 29.0
1992/93 8,000 25,364 31.5
1993/94 7,300 26,546 27.5
1994/95 10,400 26,859 38.7
1995/96 11,700 27,740 42.2
1996/97 12,100 29,239 41.4
1997/98 10,900 30,391 35.9
Source: Sinfield (2000, Table 1) and Inland Revenue (2001a, Table 7.7)
5. Distribution of Tax Expenditure on Pensions in Ireland and the U.K.
With the reduction in both Ireland and Britain in  recent years of mortgage
interest relief the tax reliefs for pension funds are now the most costly items in the
Revenue Commissioners and Inland Revenue lists of income tax expenditures.12
Individual tax payers are obliged to include details on their annual income tax return
of mortgage interest payments for which they are claiming tax reliefs.  Consequently
the Revenue Commissioners have information on the distribution of these tax reliefs
by  income class.   Unfortunately, because of the way in which the reliefs on
occupational pension contributions and pension fund income are given there is no
official information on the value of the tax relief accruing by income groups for
contributions to occupational pension funds.     However, a household survey carried
out by the ESRI in 1994 (see Callan, Nolan, Whelan, Whelan, and Williams, (1996))
contains information  on weekly gross earnings of employees who are members of
any type of  pension scheme.   These data permit us to estimate the level and
distribution for Ireland of tax reliefs on contributions to occupational pension schemes
by employees.
Information on the distribution of pension contribution tax relief by income
group has been produced for the U.K. by Agulnik and Le Grand (1998) using
unpublished data supplied by the Inland Revenue.  The data for Ireland and the U.K.
                                                
12 Structural reliefs are assumed to be part of  the benchmark tax system.
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are used in Table 6 to show by income deciles the percentage of employees in Ireland
who belong to an occupational pension scheme and the percentage of taxpayers in the
U.K. who claim tax relief on contributions to an occupational or personal pension
scheme.
Table 6:  Percentage of Employees in Ireland in 1994  Belonging to Occupational
Pension Schemes and Percentage of Taxpayers in the U.K. in 1996-97 Claiming Tax
Relief for Contributions to an Occupational or Personal Pension Ranked by Income
Deciles
Decile Ireland United Kingdom
Bottom 0.5 20.8
Second 8.9 25.7
Third 16.5 26.3
Fourth 35.6 37.7
Fifth 50.1 48.4
Sixth 59.7 56.3
Seventh 70.5 61.8
Eighth 79.4 68.2
Ninth 89.0 78.8
Top 92.7 80.7
Source: Ireland, Hughes (2000, Table 8); U.K., derived from Agulnik and Le Grand (1998, Table A1.)
The table shows that coverage of occupational pension schemes is quite good
for the top three deciles in both countries; reasonably good for middle income
employees in the fifth, sixth, and seventh deciles with from around 50 to 70 per cent
having a pension entitlement; rather poor for low income employees in the U.K. for
the bottom, second, third, and fourth deciles with only 20 to 40 per cent having an
entitlement, and  very poor for the lowest income deciles in Ireland with virtually no
occupational pension coverage for the bottom  income decile and only 10 to 35 per
cent being covered in the second to fourth deciles13. The differences between Ireland
and U.K. are most pronounced towards the bottom and top of the earnings
distribution.   The difference for the lowest income deciles may be partly due to the
fairly uniform take-up by income decile of personal pensions in the U.K.
The only data available to assess the distribution of tax support in Ireland for
occupational pensions come from the ESRI Living in Ireland survey.   It contains
information on the size of the employee contribution to occupational pension schemes
but unfortunately not on the employer contribution.   An estimate of the value of the
tax relief given to employees can be derived by income class which will show
whether the tax support provided for employee contributions is progressive,
proportional, or regressive relative to income.   The estimates of the value of the tax
expenditure as a percentage of  income take account of marital status, the standard
personal allowances,  and the relevant marginal tax rates.  The aggregate value of
pension contributions and of the tax relief are averaged across everyone in the income
class whether they make a pension contribution or not.  Data are available from the
Inland Revenue for the U.K. on the distribution by income group of employees’
                                                
13 The pattern is similar in Ireland when pension coverage rates are estimated by age group.   For
example, the coverage rate for those under 30 was 1.3 per cent for the first decile and 79 per cent for
the 10th decile.
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contribution relief for occupational and personal pensions and Agulnik and Le Grand
(1998) gross up employees’ contributions to estimate the value of tax relief on
employers’ contributions.   Lack of data for Ireland and the U.K. preclude estimates of
the distributional effect of tax reliefs on lump sums or investment income.   Table 7
shows that tax support for private pension contributions is regressive in both Ireland
and the U.K.
Table 7: Tax Relief on Employee Contributions to Occupational Pension Schemes in
Ireland in 1994 and on Employee and Employer Contributions to Private Pension
Plans in the U.K. in 1996-97 as a Percentage of Income by Income Decile
Income Decile Ireland
(Employee Contribution)
United Kingdom
(Employee and Employer
Contributions to
Occupational and Person
Pensions)
Bottom 0.06 0.71
2 0.11 0.80
3 0.18 0.83
4 0.41 1.33
5 0.76 1.39
6 0.79 1.59
7 0.85 1.69
8 1.23 1.82
9 1.72 2.29
Top 1.62 3.64
Source: Ireland, Hughes (2000, Table 8); U.K., derived from Agulnik and Le Grand (1998, Table A1.)
Note:  These figures do not include the value of tax reliefs on lump sum payments or investment
income.
The value of the relief on employee contributions alone in Ireland expressed as
a percentage of weekly income increases from less than 0.06 per cent at the bottom of
the income distribution to around 0.8 per cent in the middle and to about 1.6 per cent
at the top.   Thus, those on the lowest incomes,  less than IR£41.00 per week,  receive
hardly any benefit from the tax relief on occupational pension contributions while
those on the highest incomes, over IR£720 per week,  benefit to the extent of 1.6 per
cent of their weekly income.    For the U.K. the value of tax relief on both employee
and employer contributions as a percentage of income  rises from 0.71 per cent for
those in the bottom income decile earning less than Stg £90 per week to 3.6 per cent
for those in the top income decile earning almost Stg £870 per week on average.   Of
this tax relief, Table 8 shows that the top 10 per cent of earners in Ireland  receive
almost 40 per cent of the benefit while in the U.K. they receive over 50 per cent of the
benefit.   In Ireland the bottom 10 per cent of earners  receive only 0.1 per cent of the
tax benefit while in the U.K. they receive just 1 per cent of the tax benefit.
There are two main reasons for the regressivity of tax expenditure on private
pensions, as Le Grand and Agulnik (1998) point out.  The first is that membership of
occupational pension schemes increases strongly with income, as we have shown
above. The second is that the tax relief is given at the marginal rate of tax.   Hence,
the value of the tax relief as a percentage of income rises as income rises.  The
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interaction of these two factors results in a steady increase in the absolute value of the
tax relief on occupational pension contributions as the absolute value of income rises.
Table 8: Distribution of Tax Relief on Employee Contributions to Occupational
Pension Schemes in Ireland in 1994 and on Employee and Employer Contributions to
Private Pension Plans in the U.K. in 1996-97 by Income Decile
Income Decile Ireland
(Employee Contribution)
United Kingdom
(Employee and Employer
Contributions to
Occupational and Person
Pensions)
Bottom 0.1 1.0
2 0.4 1.3
3 0.8 1.2
4 2.5 3.9
5 5.4 4.5
6 6.5 5.3
7 8.3 8.1
8 13.9 7.5
9 24.0 15.6
Top 38.0 51.6
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Ireland, Hughes (2000, Table 8); U.K., derived from Agulnik and Le Grand (1998, Table A1.)
Note:  These figures do not include the value of tax reliefs on lump sum payments or investment
income.
The concentration of pension tax expenditures in Ireland and the U.K. on the
highest paid taxpayers is a striking example of the ‘upside-down’ nature of tax
expenditures whereby, as Sinfield (1997, p. 20) notes:
“The benefit is greater, the higher the income and the higher the marginal tax rate which is
avoided as a result of the tax mechanism.   The greatest beneficiaries are those who have the
least needs by any measure used in social policy analysis.”
6. Summary and Conclusions
 The evidence presented in this paper shows that the annual cost of tax
expenditure on pensions is substantial in Ireland, where it  amounted to  1.2 per cent
of GDP in 1997,  and the U.K., where it was not far off 1.5 per cent of GDP in the
same year.  Hence, the assumption that private pensions can be provided at little cost
to the Exchequer is not correct.   Considering pension tax expenditure in relation to
direct expenditure on public pension programmes the evidence shows that tax
expenditure in Ireland on occupational pensions now substantially exceeds the cost of
the means-tested non-contributory pension scheme and amounts to about two-thirds of
government expenditure on social insurance pension schemes.  If present trends in
pension tax expenditure continue, it may exceed in a few years time combined
expenditure on social assistance and social insurance old age pensions.    In the U.K.
the cost of pension tax reliefs substantially exceeds the cost of means-tested income
and housing support for the elderly and amounts to about one-third of direct
expenditure on basic National Retirement pensions.
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Examination of membership of private pension schemes shows that tax
incentives for pension saving result in high coverage rates for middle and high income
taxpayers but poor coverage rates for low income taxpayers in both Ireland and the
U.K. Evidence relating to the distribution of pension tax expenditure shows  that the
present tax treatment of private pensions is inequitable as about two-thirds of the
benefits accrue to the top two income deciles in both countries and 3 per cent or less
to the bottom two deciles.
PENSIM, the microsimulation model of the U.K. pension system, was used by
the Pension Provision Group at the start of the British government’s latest Pension
Review to look at the effect of current policies on pension provision in 2025.   The
Group examined how the distribution of pension incomes is likely to change over this
period.   It concluded (HMSO, 1998a, p. 109) that:
The bigger role for earnings-related pensions – state and non-state – which has been a feature of
the policy of governments for several decades, must inevitably lead to more inequality in
income in old age.
The pattern of pension provision in Ireland in the future is likely to be similar
in view of the reliance on occupational pension schemes and the concentration of tax
reliefs for pension saving on the highest income deciles.
Proposals for containing the cost of public pension systems in Europe by
relying on greater private pension provision in the future can learn from experience in
Ireland and Britain, and other countries that rely on private pensions,  that using tax
incentives to promote private pension provision could impose substantial  costs on the
Exchequer.  The regressive nature of such incentives means that all taxpayers have to
pay more taxes to provide benefits which accrue overwhelmingly to higher income
taxpayers.
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